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1.	Introduction
Interviews have been conducted with programme administrators both at the national level (the Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (DECA)​[1]​, in Silkeborg, Ebbe Poulsen and Steen Frederiksen, 20.3.09) and at regional level (North Jutland Region in Aalborg, Henning Christensen, 1.4.09), supplemented by documentary sources when appropriate. 
The main issue is the implications of the Danish decision not to notify state aid areas for programme administration in general and the handling of individual applications in particular.

2.	Responsible bodies and procedures
2.1	Responsible bodies
As mentioned in the accompanying review text, the draft of the description of the management and control system was delivered by DECA to the programmes’ controller unit in Copenhagen last summer, but the Managing Authority only received feedback in March 2009, and the document could therefore first be sent to the Commission on March 31st.
the draft of the description of the management and control system was delivered to the programmes’ controller unit in Copenhagen last summer, and the Managing Authority only received feedback in March 2009 and is now currently answering the queries of the controllers. The Commission is, understandably, becoming increasingly impatient about this delay.
The question about ‘overall responsibility’ is difficult to answer because of the multilevel nature of Structural Funds administration and the fact that Denmark has one programme covering the entire country:
	regional-level administrators are responsible for ensuring that the projects they recommend for funding comply with all relevant regulations, including those concerning state aid,
	national-level administrators in DECA are responsible for final checking compliance with regulations before granting support
	DECA is being monitored by the programme’s Controller unit in Copenhagen, and, indeed, by the Commission, both of which have a particular focus on compliance with state-aid regulations.
However, as all applications are checked by DECA, albeit through two different units responsible for the eastern and western parts of the country respectively, this national-level organisation could be said to be the single organisation responsible for ensuring compliance. However, in case an audit at a later point in time should reveal contravention of state-aid rules, it is the applicant who has to make repayments and not the various public bodies involved in checking the project and accepting it for funding – something which in a very real sense makes the beneficiary financially responsible for compliance with state aid rules.
Within DECA individual case officers are responsible for checking applications for state aid compliance, but in the current programming period a small number of state aid experts have emerged who serve as back-up for case officers. At the regional level a similar system might be useful, but currently great variation is perceived between the ways applications are handled administratively in different parts of the country, with many regions giving priority to the content of projects by organisation their employees along e.g. sectoral/cluster lines.
At the national level DECA (but also e.g. regional administrators) can obtain advice from an inter-departmental administrative committee of state aid experts associated with the Danish Competition Authority. The most important function of DECA in relation to regional-level administrators is to conduct training sessions and provide early-stage advice on individual applications prior to receiving the project with the official political recommendation of the Regional Growth Fora. Contacts with the Commission have concerned the interpretation of general rules, not individual projects).
2.2	Procedures and processes
Each application is being checked by knowing the specific details of the proposed activity, it is no longer possible simply to refer a project to a particular category in order to know which state aid rules will apply, because large and complex projects will mostly involve several different activities that constitute state aid and each of these must be handled correctly in order for the activity to be legal.
With regard to de minimis, no national database or register exists (possibly because direct financial subsidies have played a limited role in national regional and industrial policies since the early 1990s), and hence administrators rely on applicant information while action is only taken in circumstances that appear to be suspicious.
The ‘super group exemption’ is being used, as it has been decided not to apply for any notifications but instead handle state aid within the general regulatory framework for state aid. Originally it was thought that some ‘standard models’ of projects would emerge which could then be used in similar projects in the future, but in practice this has proved to be difficult due to the variation and complexity of the projects submitted which often straddle across several categories in the ‘super group exemption’, and therefore a major task has been to make regional project administrators aware of the need to distinguish between activities within a particular project, and, by implication, make applicants describe the proposed activities in sufficient detail. This is particularly important given the changing understanding of ‘undertaking’ and ‘economic activity’ (cf. section 3.1 below), because a narrow understanding of state aid as ‘direct financial grants to individual firms’ would still seem to linger on, especially among political decision-makers who for decades have been acquainted with the unavailability of such measures as a policy instrument for sub-national bodies.
No Commission monitoring/audit has been undertaken yet, and consequently state aid issues have not been addressed either.
2.3	Attitudes to compliance
For decades the official Danish position with regard to state aid has been – and still is – that these rules are crucial for the proper working of the single European market, also because a small member state like Denmark can ill afford competition on the basis of public funds with the likes of e.g. Germany, France, and the UK. 
Occasionally regions claim that DECA is unduly restrictive compared to other national authorities, but in practice it has been difficult to have this substantiated. The perception of strictness may, however, be due to the fact that while all Structural Funds are systematically checked by DECA at the national level, only a relatively limited part of regional development projects without European funding is subject to ex-post control by the National Competition Agency, although reportedly regional administrators have been surprised by verdicts given by the inter-departmental administrative committee of state aid when they have voluntary subjected projects and queries to obtain advice.
The issue of state aid would generally appear be perceived as technically difficult that has caused some delays to the flow of projects. Given the complexity of the projects it is, however, debatable whether having a set number of notifications would have made things much easier for applicants and administrators, unless, of course, one would be willing to accept that it would have been possible for national-level policy-makers to predict and describe key features of projects for the entire programming period before the first application had been handed in.
3.	Policy coordination and compatibility
3.1	Definition
Evolving definitions of what constitutes an ‘undertaking’ and ‘economic activity’ form an important part of the background for the handling of state aid in Denmark. In previous programming periods, potential conflicts with state aid rules could easily be identified because they referred primarily to private-sector applicants operating in international markets for manufactured goods, and issues concerned the level of support available for particular kinds of activities, all of which was described both in the state aid notification and indeed the Structural Funds programming documents. 
In the absence of state-aid notifications and with increasingly blurred boundary between the public and the private sector, more issues, however, are bound to arise, e.g. relating to value of advisory services or networking activities to individual firms, the commercial value of applied research in public universities, or the competitive role of public museums that develop facilities that may compete with private visitor attractions as part of the so-called ‘experience economy’. Especially in relation to complex and long-running projects, this makes it necessary to structure projects so that their various parts comply with corresponding parts of state aid regulations – this is not seen as ‘getting around’ rules, but as ensuring the legality of activities.
3.2	Reconciling regional, DG Regio and DG Comp agendas
In the Danish context state aid regulation is not seen as major obstacle for regional development activities, in the sense that Danish regional policy in general and the Structural Funds programmes in particular have long been geared to European state aid regulations, and thus the expectations of regional administrators and policy-makers have been shaped by this so that the main concern at the sub-national level appears to be the complexity of regulation and the time and resources involved in ensuring the compliance of individual projects.
In principle regional policy interventions is a form of state aid no matter what, and although this is regulated by having state aid rules (rather than an outright ban on any kind of public-sector infringement of the working of private markets), these regulations are bound to lead to occasional conflicts between organisations with interests in either, including DG Regio and DG Competition. In practice, of course, the latter is the supreme arbiter in state aid issues, but it would be seen as helpful if the two DGs coordinated their communication about rules and changes to these to a larger extent that appears to be the case.
Given the policy instruments involved in the Danish Structural Funds programmes, no use will be made of the temporary facility introduced as part of the financial crisis package, cf. the discussion in the accompanying review paper.

4.	Any other issues and conclusions
The main issue regarding state aid regulation in Denmark is clearly the implications of the decision not to notify state aid areas for programme administration in general and the handling of individual applications in particular, something which has created a situation with more uncertainty and a greater need to liaise with applicants and between regional and national administrators. It is, however, unclear whether notification would have been an advantage because it would also have required projects to comply with pre-fabricated schemata, and as such the current administrative and technical difficulties with making projects comply with state aid regulations could be seen as the price for having a larger degree of freedom with regard to project design.

5. Interviews
Henning Christensen, Head of Regional Policy Department, North Jutland Region, Aalborg.
Steen Frederiksen, Senior Consultant, DECA Silkeborg.
Ebbe Poulsen, Chief Consultant, DECA Silkeborg.
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^1	  Hitherto the Danish Erhvervs- og Byggestyrelsen was translated National Agency for Enterprise and Construction (NAEC), the change of the English version of the name appears to be presentational rather than the result of changes regarding the organisation and its remit.
